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A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency
from the Civil War to Iraq
by Mark Moyar
Reviewed by Gregory A. Daddis, Academy Professor,
Department of History, US Military Academy

A

s the American commitment to South Vietnam grew
in the early 1960s, so too did the literature on
New Haven, Conn.:
counterinsurgency. In fact, so fashionable had the topic
Yale University
Press, 2009
become that military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin decried
368 pages
“the muddy verbosity and the pompous profundity that
$20.00
are beginning to mask the whole subject of counterinsurgency and guerrilla war.” Baldwin likely would not be
surprised by the similarly abundant musings on counterinsurgency in the last
five years. He might, however, have had his interest piqued by Mark Moyar’s
latest contribution, which maintains that leadership is at the heart of successful
counterinsurgencies. In fact, A Question of Command requires careful reading.
Moyar, the Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the US
Marine Corps University, argues that the “leader-centric nature of counterinsurgency” demands identifying and developing commanders who are more
flexible, creative, and intellectually agile than their conventional counterparts.
Through nine historical case studies ranging from the American Civil War to
the present conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, Moyar’s aim is to isolate the leadership attributes of successful counterinsurgents. Indeed, he has ascertained ten
such attributes. Effective counterinsurgency leaders share the qualities of initiative (a major theme in this work), flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy,
charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization. Unfortunately,
Moyar offers little insight into how he identified these attributes, leaving the
reader to question his methodology for historical analysis.
The historical case studies form the bulk of A Question of Command,
and Moyar uses them not only to display the significance of leadership in unconventional warfare but also to critique “population-centric” and “enemy-centric”
theories of counterinsurgency. In the process, he attacks “doctrine or strategy
that dictates in detail how to defeat the insurgents.” Neither social, political,
and economic reforms nor using armed force to defeat insurgencies guarantee
success. Rather, Moyar argues, the leader who is able to adjust his methods to
local conditions is the most important factor. In the Civil War, as an example,
effective Union commanders labored to separate hostile civilians from friendly
and weighed the consequences before using armed force. (According to Moyar,
depopulation and forced resettlement, if done correctly, have benefits.) Poor
leaders allowed corruption to flourish in their commands while more capable
officers fixed bureaucratic weaknesses and replaced unprincipled commanders
who abused the local populace.
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In a refreshing addition to counterinsurgency literature, Moyar also
considers the Reconstruction era. As in the Civil War, Federal troops contended
with political ambiguities of an occupation mission and local elites who still
enjoyed the loyalty of Southern whites. Likewise, the Philippine Insurrection
demanded that US officers combat insurgent leaders from the Filipino upper
class (principalia), bolstering Moyar’s contention that counterinsurgencies
require subduing or destroying the enemy elite. The Philippines also reinforce a
major theme: destructive force selectively applied by good commanders is often
a necessary component of counterinsurgency warfare. As Moyar notes, the “US
response to the Philippine Insurrection contradicts the view . . . that civic action
is invariably more effective than military action in defeating insurgents.”
Ensuing case studies further Moyar’s defense of leadership as key
to counterinsurgency success. The Huk Rebellion in the post-World War II
Philippines illustrates the importance of host-nation leaders, in this instance,
Filipino Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay, stimulating effective
local resistance against insurgents. Moyar employs the Malayan Emergency to
show how civilian-military interagency committees could direct a war without
depriving local commanders of their freedom of action. Moyar’s balanced
chapter on the Vietnam War reveals the trials of counterinsurgency leaders
attempting to train local forces against an enemy able “to switch back and
forth between regular and irregular warfare.” Though claims of the “remarkable transformation of South Vietnamese leadership in the late 1960s and early
1970s” are unpersuasive, the Vietnam chapter demonstrates that leader development in host-nation forces is just as crucial as leader development within the
US armed forces.
Moyar reserves his final two studies for Afghanistan and Iraq. While
each conflict’s mosaic nature required (and still requires) sound leadership at
all levels, particularly the local, Moyar uses these chapters to renew his assault
on doctrinal fixations. “Afghanistan’s kaleidoscopic physical and human
landscapes,” he argues, “heightened the importance of adaptivity and further
reduced the value of doctrine.” In Iraq, the author rightly perceives more continuity between pre- and post-surge approaches to counterinsurgency than the
popular Operation Iraqi Freedom narrative indicates. As such, Moyar believes
the 2006 counterinsurgency field manual did not have as much impact as its
authors intended. The new manual even “impeded innovation to a degree by
advancing as universal certain principles and methods that were not actually
viable in all or even most counterinsurgency settings.”
Moyar’s fundamental argument makes sense. Leadership in war counts.
Yet as much as it offers a unique if simple approach to studying counterinsurgencies, A Question of Command proffers arguments that should be considered
with care. Moyar’s attack on doctrinal infatuation is fine; however, an army
founded on good doctrine does not necessarily make it doctrinaire. Whether
counterinsurgency requires a higher degree of resourcefulness than conventional operations seems equally tenuous. German and British innovations in
the World War I trenches or American tactical adjustments in the World War II
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Normandy hedgerows suggest that war, not just irregular war, requires all
armies to adapt to their enemy and surroundings. Finally, Moyar’s thinly veiled
backing of an aggressively interventionist foreign policy smacks of hubris.
Throughout this work, third-world leaders fighting insurgencies are portrayed
as inept and diffident administrators who only need American tutelage to be
successful counterinsurgents. Moyar concedes at the end, though, that such
“advice rarely sank in.”
A Question of Command is intended to assist counterinsurgents in Iraq
and Afghanistan and, on the whole, it should be read, but with a careful eye.
Moyar is surely correct that multifaceted wars require flexibility and creativity
from military and civilian leaders. If readers can navigate through this work’s
more specious supporting arguments, there is much to consider in developing
leaders comfortable with the complexities of modern war.
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